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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: AN HONEST DUPLICITY 
ABSTRACT 
Business activity - which is dominated by corporations - through the provision of 
investment, jobs and tax payments, is central to the provision and protection of Human 
Rights.  Simultaneously, there is copious evidence that business activity is a direct source of 
Human Rights violations and undermines numerous States ability to protect and provide 
Human Rights. Hence governments face a tension between encouraging investment and 
asserting authority over business activity to limit corporate excess and ensure business 
works for rather than against humanity.  The challenge in the globalised world is how 
governments can best assert that authority.  This essay will contend that a voluntary 
approach through Corporate Social Responsibility is currently the dominant approach to 
limiting corporate excess but will argue this approach is fundamentally flawed and cannot 
be relied upon to protect and enhance the provision of Human Rights.   
Introduction   
“Familiarity may breed contempt in some areas of human behaviour but in the field 
of social ideas it is the touchstone of acceptability” [p7 Galbraith 1999] 
Human Rights, it is almost universally agreed, are the standard by which 
governments’ performance regarding their citizens well-being is, or at least should be, 
gauged1.  Human Rights are expensive2 to protect and provide hence governments need 
funds for structural investment, jobs to enable citizens to provide for themselves (e.g. food) 
and tax receipts to maintain and extend existing Human Rights provision.   
                                                             
1 Human Rights as outlined by multi-lateral treaties (for example: International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966), the International Convention on Economic and Social Rights (1966), and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989)) and interpreted by international, regional and 
national courts, and Treaty Bodies, are universal and indivisible [Freeman 2002].  They are intended to protect 
every human being from the excessive use of state power and, where business practice is concerned, to 
ensure the state protects human beings within their jurisdiction, as far as is reasonably possible, from that 
which is out of an individual’s control (e.g. environmentally destructive business practice [ICESCR Art 122(b)] 
and forced labour [ICCPR Art 8]).   They also confer ‘positive’ rights on people, for example the rights to 
education [ICESCR Art 13], health [ICESCR Art 12], social security [ICESCR Art 9], freedom of association [ICCPR 
Art 22 and ICESCR Art 8] and more broadly the right to an adequate standard of living [ICESCR Art 11], and 
work [ICESCR Art 6] in a fair and safe manner [ICESCR Art 7].  No multi-lateral Human Rights treaty has been 
ratified by every state but almost every state has ratified at least one treaty which recognises that Human 
Rights exist [Ignatieff 2003, Freeman 2002]. 
2 The above (FN1) obligations require for example, effective governmental bureaucracy, the provision of 
national infrastructure (e.g. for transport and communication), schools, hospitals, housing police, and a justice 
system. 
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The most viable and sustainable sources3 of investment, jobs and tax receipts are 
Multi-National Corporations, Trans-National Corporations (MNCs, TNCs) and their supply 
chains4.  Governments and the countries they lead, therefore, are competing with each 
other for investment, jobs and tax receipts that can be provided by MNCs/TNCs in order to 
meet their Human Rights obligations and other governmental priorities (e.g. defence) 
[Stiglitz 2002, 2006, Reich 2008, Galbraith 2004, Zammit 2003, Rodrick 2007, Sen 1999, 
Bakan 2004].   
Given the fact of uneven distribution of resources and the prevailing neo-liberal 
economic dogma [Stiglitz 2002, 2006; Reich 2008], governments are pressured to compete 
vigorously and where possible to ‘stack the game’ in their favour.  If a government is able to 
persuade an MNC/TNC to provide jobs and to pay tax in their state by compromising their 
principles (e.g. reducing operational costs by reducing regulations), they are, arguably, 
obliged to make that compromise.  How else can they generate the investment and tax 
required to pay for health care, education, and the infrastructure necessary for the Human 
Rights they are obligated to provide and protect5?  This process has been labelled the ‘race 
to the bottom’ [Klein 2000, Bakan, 2004].   It is often argued a significant consequence of 
this process is a shift in power from governments to businesses (primarily MNC’s/TNC’s) [T. 
Friedman 2005, Scholte 2005, Galbraith 2004, Beck 1997].  The power in question relates to 
both sovereignty and which organisation (i.e. the government or the corporation) is most 
able to provide the resources necessary to protect or provide for Human Rights.   
Hence, it is undeniable that the impact of business on Human Rights, both positively 
and negatively, is central to any discussion relating to the future well-being of humanity and 
effective policies must be identified that will ensure businesses work for humanity not 
against it6.  To quote the Secretary General’s Special Representative on the issue of Human 
Rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie:  
                                                             
3 See: http://www.globalissues.org/article/59/corporate-power-facts-and-stats (accessed 22/08/2010) to 
compare the size of corporate ‘economies’ with national economies in 2000. 
4 This essay will not distinguish between transnational corporations, multinational corporations, privately 
owned businesses or cooperatives and partnerships because they all compete directly with each other and are 
required therefore to operate similarly competitive business models.  In fact, one would struggle to find a 
business of any sort that is not engaged in the global supply chain.  John Ruggie’s remit as the Secretary 
General’s Special Representative on the issue of Human Rights and transnational companies and other 
businesses enterprises is similarly broad [A/HRC/8/5 (2010)] 
5 NB: Sen argues that although poor states need investment TNCs/MNCs short-termist methodologies 
specifically undermine a State’s ability to provide education, health care etc. [1999].  Scholte demonstrates 
that although life expectancy has improved literacy has decreased and general poverty is static [2005] 
6 Although it is often asserted that Adam Smith and his disciples (e.g. Milton Friedman) argued that free 
markets and limited regulation will ultimately lead to “opulence for all” [T Friedman 2005, Muller 2002] a 
broader analysis of their work recognises the tendency to monopoly and the commoditisation of humanity 
which were and are both seen to represent challenges for society [Muller 2002, Heilbroner 1953, Galbraith 
1998, Smith(ed.2008) , Friedman 1962].            
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“...19. It stands to reason that Human Rights should be at the very centre of these 
concerns [about the effects of business on humanity]. Whatever other differences 
may exist in the world, starting with the 1948 Universal Declaration Human Rights 
have been the only internationally agreed expression of the entitlements that each 
and every one of us has simply because we are human beings. Thus, securing respect 
for Human Rights must be a central aim of governance at all levels, from the local to 
the global, and in the private sector no less than in the public.” [E/CN.4/2006/97, p7] 
Countless trees are felled and terra-bytes of data stored in an effort to prove that 
Corporate Social Responsibility7 (CSR) is an appropriate and effective response to the 
unbridled power exhibited by MNCs and TNCs in their legally determined single-minded 
pursuit of profit8.  It has become a feature of conventional thought within business and 
government9 that socially responsible businesses are the future.  A socially responsible 
business will not, it is assumed, exploit people and destroy the environment abroad nor 
would it adopt business strategies that lead to, for example, the Great Depression.   
This essay will outline briefly why CSR can be considered the dominant method of 
controlling corporate excesses globally and identify key criticisms which suggest CSR is an 
inherently flawed method of achieving this objective.  Topics discussed are the myth of 
positive stakeholder influence, the primacy of PR10 over operational change, the reality of 
corporate decision-making and, finally, a brief description of the psychological process that 
may explain why regular, responsible, moral and rational people can make business 
decisions that cause pain and suffering for communities and individuals.  Inherent in this 
latter description is the assertion that voluntary change of the type envisioned by 
politicians11 through CSR is unlikely to occur. 
A frequent criticism of CSR and CSR led policies within the Human Rights arena has 
revolved around its failure to provide sufficient monitoring and measurement [Zammit 
2003] rather than the concept in principle12.  This essay will not discuss monitoring or 
measurement because it assumes such monitoring, unless entirely independent, is likely to 
                                                             
7 CSR incorporates corporate agreement to and implementation of voluntary codes of conduct, corporate 
philanthropy and staff engagement strategies. 
8 See: M. Friedman [1962], Strine [2008], Ratner [2001/2] for a more detailed explanation of corporate 
obligations to generate profit 
9 See: http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2012/01/economy-capitalism-market for introduction to 
Conservative conception of ‘moral capitalism’ and 
http://www.smf.co.uk/assets/files/resources/Ed%20Miliband%20speech%20to%20Social%20Market%20Foun
dation.pdf  for a speech by the Labour leader covering similar ground (both accessed 10/03/12). 
10 In this context PR mean managing the reputation of the business in relation to customers, investors, and 
current/future employees 
11 FN9 
12 See also, http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/07/27/corporate-social-responsibility for HRW criticism of the 
Global Compact (accessed 10/03/2012).  See also FN74.  
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be flawed13, because many civil, social and cultural rights cannot be easily measured and 
because the measurement issue has been discussed at length elsewhere.  Moreover, 
effective policy should focus on harnessing corporate power to facilitate Human Rights 
provision and discourage violations.  If Human Rights violations can be monitored and 
measured; it is too late. 
A further criticism on CSR and CSR led policy is that it represents a democratic deficit 
[Reich. 2008].  Reich argues even if one accepts that businesses can or do operate within an 
ethical framework, value based decisions and compromises will regularly and necessarily be 
made14 and it is not controversial to state as fact that Corporations have no political 
legitimacy to wield such power.  Many supporters and critics of globalisation and neo-liberal 
economic policy argue that this democratic deficit is an uncomfortable reality within a 
globalised world which citizens should either embrace [T. Friedman 2005] or revolt against 
[Shiva 2010, A McIntosh 2000, Klein 2000] but that governments in their present form in the 
developed democratic economies are unable to change.    
This paper will assume that sovereign governments retain the potency required to 
harness corporate power.  Ultimately States allow businesses to operate within their 
jurisdiction [Reich 2008, Easterly 2005].  If a State determines the costs of corporate 
intrusions are not worth the benefits, they are free to reject the global market place and the 
influence of the Bretton-Woods organisations [Stiglitz 2002,2006; Easterly 2005]15.  Also, 
crucially, the States from which many of these businesses emanate (i.e. US, EU and Japan) 
have very strict regulations regarding labour rights, pollution, health and safety and product 
quality.  In short, although the challenge may appear insoluble, it is within the power of 
politicians to affect the change necessary to secure the provision and protection of Human 
Rights for all [Stiglitz 2006, Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, Easterly 2006, Reich 2008]. 
This essay will conclude that by focussing on CSR, the global community (i.e. the UN) 
and its constituent governments have chosen an approach to containing corporate excess 
which is doomed to failure and prioritised economic growth of human well-being.  If States 
take their responsibilities to help the governments of developing economies meet their 
Human Rights responsibilities (Art. 2 ICESCR) seriously they should reconsider their policy 
emphasis and seek alternative solutions.   
The dominance of CSR 
At the 22nd meeting of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights of the United Nations High Commission of Human Rights [UNHCHR] in 2003, 
                                                             
13 See Mulligan [2002] for Rio Tinto case-study and the challenges around measuring both risk and impact.  
14 Ibid [HRW] also identifies lack of clarity within the standards. 
15 See Easterly [2005] and Stiglitz [2006] for a detailed case-study of Botswana who successfully ignored 
international pressure to secure a genuinely beneficial deal for the exploitation of the countries diamond 
reserves. 
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the Sub-Commission adopted the, Norms on the responsibilities of transnational 
corporations and other companies with regard to Human Rights.  The ‘Norms’ asserted that: 
1. States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, 
respect, ensure respect of and protect Human Rights recognized in international as 
well as national law, including ensuring transnational corporations and other 
companies respect Human Rights. Within their respective spheres of activity and 
influence, transnational corporations and other companies have the obligation to 
promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect Human 
Rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights and 
interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups. 
[E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2]. 
The ‘Norms’ also state that no business enterprise should benefit from “war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced... labour ...  
arbitrary executions...violations of international law or... international crimes against the 
person” [para 3].  That business enterprise should respect the rights of workers as outlined 
by the various UN and ILO Treaties,  should not attempt to corrupt the practices of 
governments [para’s 10-12], and “shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety... of the 
goods... they provide” [para 13].  Significantly, they assert that companies “shall generally 
conduct their activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable 
development” [para 14].   
 The Norms were an authoritative step by the UNHCHR to set the tone for Human 
Rights engagement with business which could have laid the ground-work for binding legal 
obligations in the future [HRW website (accessed 14/08/2010)].  However, “[m]ost 
developing countries were not keen on intrusive regulations and most developed countries 
felt the Norms were either unnecessary or over-reaching” [Steiner, 2009, p1404-5].  The 
UNHCHR decided not to adopt the Norms [CHR res 2005/69].     
In 2006, Ruggie, in his interim report [E/CN.4/2006/97] stated that “[a]ny fair-
minded discussion of standards inevitably will cover some of the same ground [as the 
Norms]” [para 57] but that “by adopting treaty-like language, which sets out Human Rights 
principle...” [para 56] “the Norms exercise became engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses” 
[para 59] because they do not follow any international legal principles and therefore “[have] 
little authoritative basis in international law – hard, soft or otherwise”16.  In Ruggie’s view, 
States Parties should look to developments such as the Kimberley Process17 [para 47], other 
                                                             
16 See: Ratner for an alternative view. 
17 See: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ (accessed 14/08/2010).  See also recent reports that the Kimberley 
Process has been tarnished by inaction regarding Zimbabwean diamonds accessing the global market from 
Global Witness (http://www.globalwitness.org/library/kimberley-process-lets-zimbabwe-hook-again (accessed 
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voluntary schemes [e.g. the UN Global Compact (UNGC)18] [para 48] and Human Rights 
impact assessments [para 35] to ensure business practices do not violate Human Rights.   
Firstly, Ruggie’s principle objections to the ‘Norms’ are unconvincing.  The ‘Norms’ 
clearly state that States are responsible for implementing and enforcing legal limitations on 
business operations19 and it certainly is not  controversial to suggest businesses should 
operate within those laws.  Moreover, while the ‘Norms’ did impose an undefined 
obligation on business to promote Human Rights and sustainable development, Ruggie’s 
framework requires business to establish codes of conduct and remedial processes which 
could be equally onerous [A/HRC/8/5 (2010)] and therefore do not address the identified 
issue. 
Regardless of the above criticism, the result of Ruggie’s work has been to bolster a 
voluntary approach to ensuring business respect and protect Human Rights, therefore 
emphasising Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as the dominant method of controlling 
the negative impacts of business practice globally and suggesting there will be no attempt to 
create a binding international legal framework20 in the foreseeable future.  This approach 
has been endorsed by many states21 and influential companies22 although a sceptical 
analysis would suggest it is little more than the status quo to suggest states should legislate 
to protect citizens against Human Rights violations and companies should not act illegally.   
There are examples of NGOs disagreeing with the focus on CSR and some of these 
organisations attempt to utilise national legislation to hold businesses to account (e.g. ATS 
cases in the US) and these efforts have achieved some moderate success [Davis 2008].  
Equally, a number of academics [e.g. Stiglitz and Charlton 2005] and development NGO’s 
[e.g. Oxfam 2002] have sought to focus on binding international instruments or trading 
agreements.  When compared to CSR, none of these ideas represent mainstream thought 
and few benefit from significant media attention or political capital.   The purpose of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
04/03/2012) and Human Rights Watch (http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/28/zimbabwe-kimberley-process-
brink (accesses 04/03/2012)) 
18 There is a multiplicity of voluntary codes which companies can sign-up to and which confuse the average 
consumer (See: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/09/29/un-norms-towards-greater-corporate-
accountability (accessed 14/08/2010).  The UNGC specifically references Human Rights which makes it unique 
amongst the multiplicity (excepting the Sullivan Principles which focussed on Apartheid in South Africa and is 
defunct).  See: McIntosh et. al [2003] and Aaronson [2001] for summaries of codes and their content.    
19 See: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969] [VCLT] article 26 pacta sunt servanda (i.e. good faith) 
and article 53 which affirms that states cannot derogate from peremptory norms (e.g. criminalisation of 
torture) [Dixon and McCorquodale, 2003, p202])   
20 See: Nowak [2007] for discussion of a world court to adjudicate over business activities  
21 For example, the UK appointed a Minister for Corporate Responsibility in 2004 and delivered a Corporate 
Social Responsibility - Draft International Strategic Framework soon thereafter (see: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/sustainability/weee/corp_soc_resp.p
df/ accessed 13/08/2010).  NB: the Con-Lib coalition has not yet created a commensurate ministerial role.  
22 See: http://www.shell.com/home/content/environment_society/reporting/external_voluntary_codes/ 
(accessed (14/08/2010) 
 7 
 
discussion is to demonstrate that these and other ideas should be considered more 
seriously because CSR alone cannot create the Human Rights oriented business model the 
global community requires.   
The mythical positive stakeholder 
A core assumption within CSR is that business is fundamentally incompatible with 
Human Rights violations23.  The understanding is that consumers will not purchase goods 
that are associated with bad business practice and that investors would prefer to invest in 
companies with good practices.  McIntosh et. al. argue that “[t]o realise the opportunities... 
of the globalization process there is a clear need to address the unequal distribution of 
benefits, imbalances in rule making and the unsustainable use of natural resources” [2003, 
p128] 24.  The implication being that responsible business practice is a precursor to 
successful exploitation of the global supply chain. 
This assumption may be rooted in the concept of Stakeholder Theory.  Stakeholder 
Theory, as defined by Edward Freeman [1984, Philips and Freeman 2003, Freeman, Wicks 
and Parmar 2011] is proposed as ‘alternative’ to the ‘standard account’ of ‘shareholder 
capitalism’25 which “has come under much recent criticism” [p52].  In the view of Freeman 
Wicks and Pamar [2011] Stakeholder Theory is “... a more useful way to understand the 
essence of capitalism [than the standard account]”, “...[should] be seen as a theory about 
how business actually does and can work” [p52] and “... how to effectively manage a 
business... [to] create as much value as possible”. 
The reasoning underpinning Stakeholder Theory is straight-forward.  Firstly, the 
‘Separation Fallacy’, asserts that it is must be inaccurate to conceive of business decisions 
lacking any ethical and consequently most business decisions must have ethical content.  
Secondly, if we accept that most business decisions have ethical content, a series of open 
questions can be posed26 about those decisions and it is asserted, therefore, that business 
requires a general theory which answers those questions.  The authors recognise that the 
answer could be ‘only shareholder value counts’ but they assert that “... such an answer 
would have to be enmeshed in the language of ethics as well as business”. This analysis is 
then summarised by the Integration Theses (I and II) which, in summary, state ethical 
concerns are implicit in business decisions and business concerns are implicit in ethical 
concerns hence it is not logical to separate business decision from ethical decision.   
                                                             
23 See: Robinson [1998 p. I4]. 
24 See also Jenkins 2002, Zadek 2001, Aaronson 2001 and Elkington [1998]   
25 i.e. that a corporation’s activities are dominated by their legal obligation to generate maximum profit for 
their shareholders. 
26 Paraphrased: 1. For whom is value created or destroyed? 2. Who is harmed or benefitted? 3. Whose rights 
and value are enabled (and vice versa)? [Freeman, Wicks, Parmar p53] 
 8 
 
Finally, Freeman, Wicks and Parmar outline the Responsibility Principle which is 
“implicit in most reasonably comprehensive moral views” [p52].  That is, “[m]ost people, 
most of the time want to and do accept responsibility for the effects of their actions on 
other”.  The authors offer no hard evidence for ‘Separation Fallacy’ or the ‘Responsibility 
Principle’.  The following analysis of Stakeholder Theory in relation to business practise and 
Human Rights will not query the rigour or circularity of the above theorisation.  It will simply 
identify a few self-evident but referenced realities of business practice in the globalised era.   
Firstly, the value of a global supply chain for any businesses is the improved 
differential between production costs and the final product value in the market place when 
compared to the differential facilitated through regional and national supply chains.  These 
costs are reduced if workers are not unionised and if occupational health, safety and 
environmental regulations are weak [Harvey 2010, Stiglitz 2006, Reich 2008, Bakan 2004, 
Galbraith 2004].  If the “imbalances” in the system were equalised, as suggested by 
McIntosh et al above, companies would make less profit hence it would not be in their best 
interests27.   
Recent disagreements between the US and Chinese governments regarding currency 
valuation provide a useful context for this discussion.  The standard explanation of why 
China will not allow its currency to appreciate on the international currency exchanges is to 
keep production costs comparatively low to maintain China’s status as the workshop of the 
world28.  Nevertheless, opinions are surfacing that increasing labour costs are already 
beginning to make production in China too expensive and MNCs/TNCs are looking to move 
manufacturing elsewhere29.  In fact, if we consider garment manufacture, MNCs/TNSs have 
been producing goods in, for example, Vietnam30 and Bangladesh31 for many years simply 
because it is cheaper than producing them in China32.  Furthermore, a large proportion of 
garments sold in the US are produced in Mexico33, despite its relatively high cost of living34, 
because the combined cost savings provided by geographic proximity and the willingness of 
Mexican authorities to unofficially overlook unfair labour practices including human 
trafficking make it cost effective [Vulliamy 2010].  It is difficult to identify any ethical content 
in these business decisions other than those relating to a business managers fiduciary duty 
                                                             
27 There are undoubtedly examples of industries where it is demonstrably counter-productive to undertake 
questionable business practices but this does not appear to reflect the macro decisions made by corporate 
business leaders. 
28 See: http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/10/chinas_currency (accessed 11/03/12) 
29 See: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/07/china-manufacturing_n_1000305.html  
30 See: http://www.economist.com/node/18775499 (accessed 14/04/12) 
31 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14971258 (accessed 14/04/12) 
32 See: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/business/global/17textile.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 
14/03/12)  
33 See: http://www.fibre2fashion.com/industry-article/29/2818/mexican-textile-industry-a-report1.asp 
(accessed 14/04/12)  
34 See: http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/rankings_by_country.jsp (accessed 14/04/2012) 
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to share-holders.  Consequently, the profit imperative which drives business decisions, on 
this analysis, can be inversely associated with the protection and provision of Human Rights.  
Secondly, we should consider the issue of companies colluding with governments 
with bad Human Rights records.  Google35 and Yahoo36, for example, have aided the Chinese 
governments’ efforts to limit access to information and encroach on individual’s freedom of 
expression37 in order to gain a licence to operate within the fastest growing internet market 
amongst the major States [HRW 2006].  If either business takes a principled stance they lose 
the opportunity to profit from China’s economic development.  If they choose to operate in 
China, they must agree to collude to violate individual’s Human Rights38.  As previously 
identified, companies listed on the various globally significant stock exchanges are legally 
obliged to seek out the maximum available profit39, consequently it can be argued that 
regardless of some stakeholder pressure (e.g. a portion of consumers in the US, NGOs and 
some journalists), both firms should collude with China’s government in order to maximise 
profit for shareholders [M. Friedman 1962, Reich 2008].  Hence we can evidence again that 
capitalist profit imperative can be inversely associated with the protection and provision of 
Human Rights. 
An alternative view is that by operating in states with bad Human Rights records, 
companies have the opportunity to influence positively state practice [Allen 2000].  
However, as we know from the above experience and companies operating in Apartheid 
South Africa [Truth and Reconciliation Committee Vol. 4 Ch 2 (1998) (TRC)], it is at least 
equally likely that companies will become complicit in Human Rights violations rather than 
facilitating change.  Nevertheless, we should not overlook entirely Adam Smith’s assertion 
that trade will ultimately lead to more freedom and higher standards of living which was 
evident during the enlightenment [Heilbroner 1953] and may be evidenced to some extent 
today [Meyer 1998]. 
                                                             
35 See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4787917.stm (accessed 13/08/2010) for summary of internet censorship 
debate and the role of search engines.  See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8582233.stm 
(accessed 13/08/2010) for up-to-date summary of the tumultuous relationship between Google and the 
Chinese Government. See: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203436904577155003097277514.html for Wall Street 
Journal article outlining Google’s decision to expand operation in China. 
36 See: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-yahoo.html (accessed 
13/08/2010) to read about Yahoo supporting Chinese prosecutions of dissidents 
37 ICCPR Art 19(2) “this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds... through any choice of media” 
38 Since agreeing to collude with the China government, Google has attempted to circumvent China’s 
restrictions in a response to hacking of Gmail accounts but the search engines results are still censored in 
mainland China hence Google despite is still tacitly colluding with censorship (see: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8582233.stm accessed 14/04/2012).    
39 See recent arguments between News Corporation and its major shareholders regarding management 
appointments and business strategies [see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/feb/29/news-corp-
shareholders-james-murdoch (accessed 11/03/12)] 
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Thirdly, we should consider the stakeholder group which evidently holds most sway 
in corporate decision making; the shareholders.  In order to understand whether a 
company’s shareholders are likely to enable a company to avoid violating Human Rights, it is 
important to ascertain who the majority of company shareholders are.  Spencer identifies 
that “... around 70% of shares in UK public companies... are owned by institutional 
investors... who, as a result of their own profit-making obligations, are not going to call for 
companies to be more responsible and make less profit...” [2004, p8] which somewhat 
stymies suggestions that investors are likely to force businesses to change profitable 
practices to improve their Human Rights record.   
There is some evidence that certain categories of institutional shareholders will 
make ethical decisions about their investments.  For example, some US State employee 
pension funds, famously but not exclusively CalPERS, have determined not to invest is some 
businesses and to divest their interests in others because they believe some business 
practices, which are negative regarding Human Rights, will ultimately undermine the value 
of the businesses they invest in40.  Although this approach is laudable it should be noted 
that such decisions, CalPERS governance principles make clear41, are based on a broad 
interpretation of investment risk (i.e. one that includes climate change), the principle of 
sustainable business growth42 and a commitment to compliance with State directives 
regarding specific corporate activities (e.g. trade with Iran or Sudan43) rather than a Human 
Rights based or otherwise defined ethical framework.     
Most significantly, these institutional investors do not shape the overall investment 
market because they do not represent the majority of the market.  Most insurance 
companies, banks and pension providers are publically listed hence their managers have 
fiduciary duty to their shareholder.  Indeed, using a counterfactual scenario, it is entirely 
feasible to conceive of a circumstance where publically listed institutional investors would 
not want to invest in businesses that CalPERS or similar funds invest in because their criteria 
for investment could undermine the profitability of that business.  In such circumstances, 
given that CalPERS et al do not represent the majority of institutional investors in the 
market place, the rational ‘business decision’ would be to refuse to accede to CalPERS 
demands44 and secure finance elsewhere.  In the long run, this could weaken CalPERS 
                                                             
40 See: http://www.calpers-governance.org/ (accessed 03/03/2012) 
41 See: http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/principles/2011-11-14-global-principles-of-accountable-
corp-gov.pdf (accessed 11/03/12) 
42 See: http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=about/press/pr-archive/pr-2009/mar/restructure-hedge-
fund.xml (accessed 04/03/2012) 
43 CalPERS put pressure on companies to stop aiding Human Rights violators [Crilly 2010] by operating in Sudan 
(http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/13/business/fi-calpers13 (14/08/2010)) prior to the US governments 
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (2007) See: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-742 (accessed 
04/03/2012). 
44 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/jun/10/oilandpetrol.news (accessed 14/04/2012) 
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position regarding its own investors because fewer strong investment opportunities were 
available to it. 
Fourthly, a key group of stakeholders for many businesses is the consumer.  If 
consumers stop buying a product because of human right violations they would not be 
achieving maximal profitability and would have to change practice.  It is frequently asserted 
that companies like Nike introduced CSR policies to ‘manage out’ bad practice and head-off 
potentially disastrous consumer backlashes resulting from stories about garments made in 
sweatshops which violate Human Rights45 [Jenkins 2002, Zadek 2001, Aaronson 2001].  
There is, however, little evidence such pressure exists en masse46.  A survey of 
consumers in Canada in 2000 indicated that only 5% would be willing to pay more for ethical 
products [Jenkins, 2002, p29] and while The Fairtrade Foundation suggests this view may be 
pessimistic47, the recent success of Fairtrade products in the UK has been secured by 
‘mainstreaming’ Fairtrade status without increasing consumer costs48 rather than 
motivating consumers to pay more for ethical products.  This is significant because unless 
consumers demonstrate they are prepared to accept higher prices in order to maintain 
corporate profit margin, that corporate is not likely to change its practices and risk losing 
market share.     
It should be noted, also, that many businesses are insensitive to consumer choice 
pressures [Hepple 1999].  Trafigura, for example, sells its services to corporations that, 
through their profit imperative, are legally obliged to minimise operating costs hence seek 
the lowest supplier costs possible.  If Trafigura can lower their costs by breaking/avoiding 
environmental regulations they appease their customers and their investors.  
Unsurprisingly, Trafigura has demonstrated operational practices that disregard the Human 
Rights (e.g. the right to health) of the citizens of countries they operate in or near49. 
In summary, it is asserted that it is in business’ best interest to have effective CSR 
policies because their key stakeholders demand it and Stakeholder Theory was developed to 
                                                             
45 Sweatshop manufacture can be considered a Human Rights violation when one refers to “[t]he core ILO 
Conventions such as... the 1948 Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, the 1949 Convention 
concerning the Application of the Principle of the Right to Organise and to Collectively Bargain, and the 1981 
Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment [which] provide basic 
rights for workers” [Subedi, 2003, p192] and ICCPR Art 22(1).  See: Rodriguez-Garavito [2005] for a recent 
description of working practices within Nike’s global supply chain.  
46 See: Reich [2008], Ch8, which compares the distinction between the fair deal citizens often espouse with the 
cheapest price a consumer wants and the highest return an investor wants.  He explains that if you take 
retirement funds into account most people occupy all three personas but that the latter two affect individuals 
directly and therefore take precedence. 
47 See: http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/business_services/why_offer_fairtrade.aspx  (accessed 14/08/2010) 
48 See: http://www.co-operative.coop/food/ethics/Ethical-trading/Fairtrade/ (accessed 18/08/2010) 
49 See:  http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/may/13/trafigura-ivory-coast-documents-toxic-waste  
(accessed 14/04/2012)  
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support this analysis.  There is copious evidence to suggest that in practice, customers want 
cheap products and the majority of shareholders want companies to meet their fiduciary 
obligations and maximise their return.  Hence it is reasonable to argue that the influence of 
the ethical stakeholder as expounded by the CSR community, governments and the UN is 
overstated.   
The primacy of PR50 over substantive operational change 
The analysis in the previous section argues that business, in general, seeks to keep its 
consumer prices competitive to maintain market share and profits high to maintain investor 
confidence.  Yet we know that businesses have developed highly evolved CSR policies and 
sign up to CSR initiatives such as the UN Global Compact51.  Businesses and commentators 
agree that this is because businesses care what consumers think but they cannot afford to 
amend their operation practice and become uncompetitive in the consumer market place52.  
Consequently we can see a contradiction between the image a business wants and the 
operational practice a successful market-oriented business needs.   
In 1970, Milton Friedman discussed the issue of CSR in the New York Times Magazine 
when he suggested that: “... in practice the doctrine of social responsibility is frequently a 
cloak for actions that are justified on other grounds rather than a reason for those actions” 
and went on to say that CSR: 
“... may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the wage bill or 
lessen losses from pilferage and sabotage or have other worthwhile effects” and that 
“[i]t would be inconsistent of me to call on corporate executives to refrain from this 
hypocritical window-dressing because it harms the foundations of a free society. That 
would be to call on them to exercise a "social responsibility"! If our institutions, and 
                                                             
50 i.e. reputation management. See: http://www.cipr.co.uk/content/careers-cpd/careers-pr/what-pr (accessed 
14/04/12) for a definition and explanation of PR. 
51 Jerbi describes companies signing up to the UN Global Compact as ‘blue rinsing’ which implies companies 
gain public absolution for previous malfeasance by supporting a voluntary scheme with no  monitoring or 
powers of enforcement [2009].  See also Human Rights Watch criticism of the Global Compact: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/07/27/corporate-social-responsibility (accessed 14/04/2010).   
52 Hence although Nike have made the public aware of their CSR policy and support positive projects (see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/global/18shirt.html?scp=3&sq=nike%20factory&st=cse 
(accessed 13/08/2010)) it required public pressure for them to provide redundancy support to workers in 
Honduras (see: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/business/global/27nike.html?ref=nike_inc (accessed 
13/08/2010) who were victims of aggressive cost-cutting measures 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/business/18nike.html?ref=nike_inc (accessed 13/08/2010).  See also 
Rodriguez-Garavito [2005].  NB: even if Nike had created a model global supply chain other major garment 
manufacturers have not (See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/08/gap-next-marks-spencer-
sweatshops (accessed 15/08/2010) 
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the attitudes of the public make it in their self-interest to cloak their actions in this 
way, I cannot summon much indignation to denounce them”53.   
In essence, CSR is a valid business practice if motivated by profit rather than ethics.   
 There are two key points to elaborate here.  Firstly CSR for the purposes of good PR 
(or the other benefits listed by Milton Friedman) is not necessarily negative as regards 
Human Rights.  Companies support charities/NGO’s – many of which operate in the Human 
Rights field - in a variety of ways and often create tangible improvements.  Whether through 
funding new projects which the government is unable to support without proven 
outcomes54, meeting funding gaps created by cuts in government funding55, providing 
expertise lacking in the third sector56, providing Gifts-in-Kind57, providing funded volunteers 
to support projects58 or even helping to build brand awareness by association with 
household names59; there are both tangible and intangible benefits to be achieved for 
voluntary organisations.  While we should be careful not to overstate the value of this in 
relation to the bottom-line or turn-over of a business [Reich 2008], from the beneficiary 
organisation’s perspective, this support is often vital60.     
Secondarily, business practice appears to match Milton Friedman’s argument.  For 
example BP, has spent considerable monies to rebrand itself as a green energy company61.  
BP adopted a new logo which gave the public a softer image and created a new corporate 
language which separated BP the globally trusted corporate citizen from British Petroleum 
the oil company62.  On one hand, BP states: 
“...[o]ur reputation, and therefore our future as a business, depends on each of us, 
everywhere, every day, taking personal responsibility for the conduct of BP’s 
business”. The BP code of conduct is an essential tool to help our people meet this 
aspiration. The code summarizes our standards for the way we behave. All our 
                                                             
53 See: http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html 
(accessed 13/10/2010).  It is worth noting that Milton Friedman’s considered CSR to be anti-democratic [1962 
p133-136] which Reich agrees with [2008]. 
54 See Ford Foundation which has a commitment to supporting untried solutions to existing problems. See: 
http://www.fordfoundation.org/ (accessed 26/08/2010) 
55 Especially relevant in the UK today where government funding through programmes like Supporting People 
is set to cut dramatically (See: http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Articles/2010/06/07/114665/cutbacks-
under-way-as-councils-prepare-for-slashing-of-grants.htm (accessed 14/08/2010) 
56 Business in the Community - http://www.bitc.org.uk/ (accessed 14/08/2010) - to see the variety of practical 
ways businesses support charities/NGO’s 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
60 See: The Ford Foundation: http://www.fordfoundation.org/ (accessed 14/08/2010) which distributed more 
the $450m in 2009. 
61 See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/849475.stm (accessed 14/08/2010) 
62 Ibid 
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employees must follow the code of conduct. It clearly defines what we expect of our 
business and our people, regardless of location and background. Ultimately it is 
about helping BP people to do the right thing.” [BP Website63] 
On the other, BP has a particularly bad record of environmental and health and 
safety conduct64.  Leaks in Alaska65, fatal explosions in Texas66 and the recent fatal and 
environmentally destructive disaster in the Gulf of Mexico67 demonstrate the distinction 
between corporate image and corporate practice.  Importantly until the Gulf of Mexico 
disaster, lower profile events made little or no impact on the company’s profitability68 
although undoubtedly the various oil price spikes have aided this process69.   
The issue is not limited to BP, all major oil companies have well funded CSR 
programmes often imbued with Stakeholder Theory and well developed ‘positive 
communications strategies’ but, as demonstrated by Ghazvinian’s survey of oil production in 
Africa, few if any show a consistent operational commitment to Human Rights [2007] 
despite many being members of the UN Global Compact (e.g. Shell Plc, BP Plc, and Total70).  
Similar observations can be made of most industries ranging from garment manufacturers71 
to food producers [Schlosser 2001, Richter 2001], and technology firms72 [Klein 2001].  It 
appears that business leaders are taking Milton Friedman’s advice and working to give the 
impression of ethical practice while seeking to maximise profitability. 
The Business Decision 
The explicit theme within the above two sections of analysis is that business of all 
hues is bottom-line focussed.  Hence, it is extremely difficult to evidence the positive impact 
stakeholders can have whilst it is straight-forward to evidence examples where businesses 
                                                             
63 See: http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9003494&contentId=7006600 (accessed 
14/08/2010) 
64 See: http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/2085/, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/05/congressman-bp-safety-oil-spill, & 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energy-environment/13bprisk.html?_r=1  (all accessed 
14/08/2010) 
65 See: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bps-oil-spill-in-alaska-blamed-on-costcutting-
449167.html (accessed 14/08/2010) 
66 See: http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100812/bs_nm/us_bp_refinery_texascity_osha & 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16653673/ (both accessed 14/08/2010) 
67 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/16/bp-oil-spill-leak-stopped (accessed 14/08/2010) 
68 See: http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/BP_%28BP%29 (accessed 14/08/2010).  See also Muchlinski [2001] 
p40 
69 See: http://inflationdata.com/inflation/images/charts/Oil/Inflation_Adj_Oil_Prices_Chart.htm (accessed 
14/08/2010) 
70 NB: US oil firms generally have not joined the UN Global Compact 
71 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/08/gap-next-marks-spencer-sweatshops (accessed 
15/08/2010) and Vulliamy [2010] 
72 See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9006988/Mass-suicide-protest-at-Apple-
manufacturer-Foxconn-factory.html (accessed 14/04/2012) 
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seek to benefit from CSR oriented PR whilst making few substantial changes to their 
operations.  It is cheap to compose a code of conduct or to discard a ‘rogue’ supplier but it 
could prove disastrous for a business to jettison or undermine the advantage of a bottom-
line focussed global supply chain73.   
  With this perspective in mind, efforts have been made to prove that unethical 
business practices can and do affect the profitability of a business.  In a recent CEO Briefing 
produced by the UNEP Finance Initiative, Human Rights Workstream [2008] the case was 
made thus: 
“Companies that are perceived as being implicated in Human Rights violations may 
be targeted by NGOs or the press, with consequent impacts on their brand or 
reputation, their share prices, their ability to access markets, and their ability to 
recruit the best employees. Conversely, organisations with a good Human Rights 
record should be able to achieve a range of commercial benefits such as enhanced 
reputation and image, more secure ‘licence to operate’, improved employee 
recruitment and retention, reduced risk of litigation, opportunities for new business 
and better stakeholder relationships. There may also be broader social benefits as a 
consequence of businesses operating in a responsible manner such as increased trust 
between business and the community or, depending on the country, a decline in 
social unrest.” [p4] 
 
The primary concern with this analysis - which is fundamental to if not always explicit within 
critiques of Stakeholder Theory and CSR - is that such commercial benefits and risks are not 
categorical or straightforwardly quantifiable.  Importantly, the above passage is concluded 
with the following sentence: “[d]espite the potential benefits of having a good Human 
Rights record, the business case is not clear cut; there may be trade-offs between short-term 
costs (e.g. the risks of losing some business to competitors with lower standards) and these 
longer-term benefits” [p4].  Hence in a document designed to persuade Chief Executive 
Officers of businesses that have a macro affect on the provision and protection of Human 
Rights the only reference to a business case for action concludes with a sentence which 
asserts there is no business case for a Human Rights oriented business model and that such 
a model may affect your profits negatively in the short-term while long-term benefits are 
both unquantifiable and uncertain.  While honest and realistic such an approach is unlikely 
to engender change in businesses that are legally obliged to maximise profit.  Nevertheless, 
this line of thought requires further pursuit. 
 
                                                             
73 FN51 
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Distinct from but related to Human Rights, growing concerns about the environment 
- its general health and the limited resources therein – have prompted academics74 and 
others75 to apply statistical methods to estimate tangible costs of environmental 
degradation caused by both routine and irresponsible business practice (i.e. the method of 
21st century living).  In his watershed report, Sir Nicholas Stearn summarised and explained 
the resulting data and conclusions as evidence of a market failure which required pro active 
policy making and business cooperation to ameliorate. 
 
This argument is then extended further with the concept of Universal Ownership 
which is outlined in the UNEP Finance Initiative document Universal ownership: why 
environmental externalities matter to institutional investors [2010].  The concept of 
Universal Ownership is straightforward.  Institutional investors invest considerable sums in a 
variety of businesses and other assets.  Consequently while they may profit from one 
business in their portfolio degrading the environment that degradation may undermine the 
profits generated by other aspects of their portfolio.  For example, the operations of the 
extractive industries can undermine the profits of businesses that invest in real estate or 
tourism and one fund may own holdings in all three types of businesses.  Alternatively, 
unpredictable weather caused by ‘Global Warming’ could destroy crops from a major 
agricultural business or decrease profits margins in supermarket chains.   
 
More enigmatically, the above document states: 
 
“Institutional investors are exposed to rising costs that contribute to economic and 
market risks.  These costs could affect asset values and fund returns.  Reducing 
environmental externalities would reduce net costs in the economy and ultimately 
benefit Universal Owners.” 
 
And: 
“Most large equity funds invest in many companies with significant environmental 
impacts.  Findings suggest that reducing environmental costs from listed companies 
held in diversified equity portfolios could significantly reduce global externalities, 
boosting economic output overall.” [p10]  
 
On the face of it, the logic that environmental externalities could undermine 
profitability may be similarly credible within the dialogue around business and Human 
Rights.  The ‘Arab Spring’, for example, exemplifies what can happen in countries where 
Human Rights are not properly protected or provided for and turmoil of this nature 
undeniably affects businesses.  Specifically within the most recent chapter of the ‘Spring’ in 
                                                             
74 N. Stearn, The Stearn Review on the Economics of Climate Change (London, HM Treasury, 2006) 
75 The UK government commissioned the above research 
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Syria, major MNCs/TNCs, especially oil companies76, have collaborated with the governing 
regime for many years and now risk losing their investment income in the short term and, if 
the regime does fall, potentially losing the legitimacy to operate within Syria in the future.   
 
 There are, however, a number of fundamental oversights within this analysis.  Firstly, 
it assumes the argument is credible regarding the global warming debate.  As outlined 
above in the discussion around CalPERS, although there are certainly examples of 
institutional investors that take climate change seriously, there are plenty that do not.  In 
fact, within the Universal Ownership document adjacent to the above quotes a Director of 
an investment fund business states: 
 
“[w]e see the Universal Ownership concept as an absolutely essential part of our 
investment philosophy – addressing externalities is crucial.  Markets that are not 
working properly destroy value for participants and have inefficiencies.  If a company 
is constantly externalising costs it is less efficient than its rivals.  If the former is 
outperforming the latter this is not in the interests of the company owners.” [Paul 
Lee, Director, Hermes Equity Ownership Services, p10] 
 
 It is difficult to interpret this quote definitively because we are not sure what impact 
Hermes’ investment philosophy has on its investment practise.  However, Paul Lee appears 
to suggest that a business which externalises costs and consequently outperforms its 
competitors is not operating in the interests of it owners.  Is Paul Lee suggesting Hermes 
would not invest in a business that was outperforming its rivals?  This seems doubtful.  
Moreover, although the answer to that question is uncertain, it is certainly true that 
Hermes, the business Paul Lee represents, has an award winning Commodities Team77 
which invests in, amongst many other things, oil.  This speculation drives up prices and 
increases profits for oil prospectors, refiners and distributors78 thus encouraging trade in a 
product that is contributing to the environmental challenges humanity faces.    
 
Secondly, the impact of environmental degradation and climate change can be 
quantified albeit including substantial margins for error [Stearn 2006] because material 
change cause material costs which relate directly to existing income and expenditure.  If oil 
prospecting and refining is becoming increasingly challenging due to scarcity we can safely 
predict increased fuel costs which increase operating costs of every business [Brown 2009].  
Similarly, if climate change increases the risk of floods, that risk can be calculated and 
                                                             
76 See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/02/syria-eu-sanctions-idUSL5E7N21KG20111202 (accessed 
10/03/2012) 
77See:  http://www.hermes.co.uk/NewsEvents/DisplayFullPost/tabid/548/PostID/147/language/en-
US/Default.aspx (accessed 04/03/2012) 
78 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/feb/02/shell-profits-up-54-percent-oil and FN67 
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insurance premiums for building, stock and means of production increase proportionally (or 
as far as the market will allow)79.  
 
In contrast, where Human Rights are concerned, it is exceedingly difficult to conceive 
of the credible risk calculations which could be taken into account by business strategists 
and decision makers.  On one hand, it is true, as outlined above, that TNCs and MNCs will 
lose money on investments made in Syria at least in the short-term.  Yet similar investments 
in many African States with atrocious Human Rights records where businesses necessarily 
collaborate with corrupt and brutal governments [Ghazvinian 2009] consistently deliver 
substantial and reliable profits.  Similar evidenced is identified above relating to businesses 
operating in China.   
 
Thirdly, even if by utilising the principle of Universal Ownership institutional 
investors did decide not to invest in businesses because of their acquiescence to or 
participation in Human Rights violations, other aspects of their investment business may 
work to undermine these efforts.  Again, Hermes’ award winning Commodities Fund Team 
undertakes commodity speculation which is a key driver of increased food prices80 
fundamentally impact on States’ ability to Article 11 of the ICESCR that stipulates there is a 
right to an adequate standard of living which incorporates “adequate food” [Art.11(1)] and 
that everyone has a right to be “free from hunger” [Art. 11(2)]. 
 
Fourthly, the operative word for our purposes in many of the above quoted passages 
(as highlighted in bold) references the lack of certainty in outcome.  It is accepted within 
economics from Smith to Stiglitz that within the capitalist system the purpose of the 
capitalist through their business (either as entrepreneurs or managers) is to invest unutilised 
or underutilised funds (i.e. capital) for the purpose of increasing its value.  As outlined by 
Galbraith, the social value or utility of a product made within capitalism is irrelevant 
because the role of the capitalist within the dominant economic model (i.e. free market 
capitalism) system is to facilitate growth81.  It was this growth that led Keynes to declare 
that: 
 
“...assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the 
economic problem [i.e. the provision of absolute needs e.g. food], or be at least in sight of 
solution, within a hundred years.  This means that the economic problem is not – if we look 
into the future – the permanent problem of the human race” [Essays in Persuasion, p197]        
                                                             
79 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/28/climate-change-climate-change-
scepticism (accessed 14/04/2012) 
80 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jan/23/food-speculation-banks-hunger-poverty 
(accessed 04/03/2012) 
81 See also David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital, [2010], for A Marxian analysis of capitalist systems 
requirement of compound growth. 
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In essence the foundation of the capitalist system is that businesses assess risk and 
make decisions with a myopic focus on profit to achieve growth and that in and of its self is 
positive.  Essentially the capitalist system is envisioned by its prime theorists (from Smith to 
Keynes) to be a utilitarian approach to improving general well-being82.  This objective is 
reinforced by the legal obligation of publically listed companies to focus on profit for 
shareholders.  By-products of this profit are personal enrichment, returns for their investors, 
tax payments for the state, the provision of goods and services which citizens use, jobs, and 
environmental degradation and the exploitation of people.  This explains the general focus 
on profit and where business expertise lies.  A business is a bureaucracy [Galbraith 2004] 
whose expertise it to deliver consistent profits (i.e. growth) in an unpredictable world.     
 
When contemplating an investment, the business decision-maker may well take 
seriously the risk of Human Rights violations and environmental degradation and, in line 
with various codes of conduct they will undertake assessments with a view to minimising 
the likelihood of those risks coming to fruition.  However, unless it is probable that those 
risks will prevent the business investment making a profit, those risks will not prevent the 
business making the investment.  To not invest in an opportunity that will provide near 
certain profit, is to make an ethical rather than a business decision thereby disregarding its 
fiduciary duty to its shareholders and confusing its role as risk synthesiser.     
 
For example, Mulligan [2002] provides an investigation into environmental and 
Human Rights assessments used by Rio Tinto.  His work focuses on a titanium dioxide mine 
in Madagascar and demonstrated that Human Rights risks which were deemed 
unquantifiable were rated as less important than the benefits that could be quantified (e.g. 
income and job creation). Mulligan recognised that although the potential impact on the 
environment and the Human Rights of the indigenous community that lived in the area were 
unquantifiable – it is probably impossible to evaluate the financial value of community life 
or ancient rituals – the project was highly likely to be catastrophic83 [2002].   
Given Rio Tinto’s experience of similar projects elsewhere [Kirsch 2003], there were 
almost definitely individuals within the firm that understood the potential risks yet despite 
this, Rio Tinto, who considered this project to be one of a new breed of community oriented 
mines84, and regardless of their code of conduct which recognises indigenous communities 
                                                             
82 FN5 
83 See also Mining and Environmental Human Rights in Papua New Guinea by Stuart Kirsch [Frynas and Pegg 
2003] for an additional analysis of the incompatibility of mining and Human Rights 
84 See: http://www.riotinto.com/documents/Library/Review89_March09_A_promise_fulfilled.pdf (accessed 
14/08/2010) 
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unique Human Rights needs85; failed to give Human Rights including environmental 
concerns sufficient weight within their impact assessment.  We know this because before 
the mine was fully operational many of the environmental and Human Rights concerns 
identified by Mulligan had come to fruition86.  The only certain method for Rio Tinto to avoid 
the inherent risk in this project would have been to cancel it [Kirsche 2003], which would 
have been an ethical rather than a business decision.     
 
In summary, although there are numerous high-level efforts to change business 
assumptions and decision making, the basic business calculation where profit assumes 
primacy above all other concerns is inherent within every decision.  Society cannot expect a 
business whose purpose is to make profit out of operating mines to make a decision not to 
open a mine which is definitely going to deliver a profit because a community or the 
environment might be damaged.   
To quote Hinkley: 
“Most government [action] fails to create corporate citizenship or social 
responsibilities because it does not recognise that corporations are not self-regulated by 
moral standards, a sense of right or wrong or human consciences.  Such regulation often 
attempts to achieve its goals by threatening organisations that are legal creations and are 
incapable of being threatened as they are of being remorseful or shamed” [2000, p291]. 
Psychological Analysis 
As consumers and investors we are detached from the impact our decisions make 
and may even feel powerless to affect the changes we may believe as citizens are correct 
[Fisher 2009, Reich 2008].  However, given that the vast majority of employed people work 
for businesses, it is members of the public that directly facilitate or contribute to Human 
Rights violations [Fisher 2009].  Yet we know the majority of people are family and 
community oriented law-abiding citizens who would not in normal circumstances choose to 
violate someone’s Human Rights [Reich 2008, Hamilton and Sanders 1999].   
As stated by Freeman, Wicks and Parmar: “[l]et’s not send business to the moral 
ghetto, so that in most of our lives we are complicated fathers and mothers, partners., lovers 
and citizens, yet in business we are greedy little basterds trying to maximise self-interest and 
best the other guy” [2011 p69].  Indeed it is difficult to believe in the Rio Tinto example 
                                                             
85 See: Rio Tinto’s code of conduct 
[http://www.riotinto.com/documents/ReportsPublications/The_way_we_work_2009.pdf  (accessed 
18/08/2010)] at p14   
86 See: Friends of the Earth media briefing 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/media_briefing/mining_madagascar.pdf (accessed 14/08/2010) 
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above that all the decision-makers, planners and assessors were knowingly colluding to 
violate peoples’ Human Rights and destroy the local environment.   
 
This observation does not necessarily mean, as Freeman, Wicks and Parmar [2011] 
assert, that Stakeholder Theory is a better description of business.  Rather, it is more likely 
these employees trusted the accepted business processes and cost/benefit analysis 
techniques more than their personal analysis.  Hence, in contradiction to Freeman’s 
Responsibility Principle outlined earlier, individuals do not take responsibility for their 
actions.  According to Fisher, employees do not humanise business practice because they 
have tacitly accepted ‘Capitalist Realism’ [2009]; we accept the world is structured by the 
harsh rationale of economic efficiencies because it is, not because it has to be.  Regardless 
of the philosophical explanation, there is clearly dissonance between personal ‘moral’ 
standards and work-place decision-making. 
   
Since the Second World War, a series of psychological experiments and 
investigations were undertaken to understand how ‘normal’ people become embroiled in 
genocide and other in-human activities.  From Festiga’s [1959] work on cognitive 
dissonance, through Milgram’s [2005] obedience experiments in the 1960’s to Zimbardo’s 
[2007] experiments modelling prison guard behaviours in the 1970’s, we have developed a 
corpus of understanding that may shed light on business behaviours.   
Festiga argued that people resolve atypical behaviours by, amongst other factors, 
subconsciously moulding their memories so their remembered behaviours more closely 
match their typical behavioural patterns [1959].  Milgram demonstrated that people can be 
encouraged to perpetrate heinous acts without physical threat or significant personal 
benefit and participants will frequently rationalise their actions post hoc [2005].  Zimbardo 
illustrated that once people have adopted an imposed behavioural pattern from an 
authority figure they frequently adopt it as their own and embellish it with their own 
behavioural flourishes which can often be worse than the initial instructions [2007].  
Zimbardo also identified a feedback process where a subordinate’s behavioural flourishes 
become accepted by the authority figure [2007].   
These observed psychological mechanisms are supported by historical analysis 
[Browning 2005, Coster 1999] and psychological analysis of scenarios which have led to 
extreme Human Rights violations [Mann 2005, Staub 2003, Feshbach 1992].  The important 
point to note is that these behaviours are not typical of a particular type of person or 
peoples – in Milgram’s case similar experiments have been conducted all around the world 
with similar results [Blass 2004] – they are human group behaviours which occur 
subconsciously and therefore can be considered relevant in a variety of circumstances (e.g. 
a company) [Hamilton and Sanders 1999].   
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This essay will not go further and provide a detailed psychological analysis of 
business culture and the social mechanism that enable ‘normal’ people to facilitate Human 
Rights abuses in the name of profit87.  This brief summary may, however, go some way to 
supporting the argument that it is unrealistic to expect people who work within a structured 
group environment, whose raisen d’etre is, and behaviours are, constantly and consistently 
affirmed and reinforced by external authorities (e.g. the media [Herman and Chomsky 
1998]) to voluntarily change their behaviours [Kiesler & Kiesler 1970].  Importantly, it is 
equally feasible that the assumptions made by corporate employees facilitated by the 
organisation they operate within will infiltrate governmental decision-making if only 
because many political leaders have themselves experienced successful business careers 
and because businesses are able to influence government policy through, for example, 
political ‘donations’.      
Could a CSR manager decide and implement a decision the implication of which 
would prevent the business they represent from making billions of dollars profit?  It is 
unlikely that they could.  Yet they are still employed to make the business operate in a more 
humane manner hence cognitive dissonance occurs.  Using the psychological analysis above, 
the CSR Manager would reason that the community will benefit in a measurable way, that 
reasonable steps have been undertaken to protect the community’s Human Rights, that 
independent consultants88 were employed at considerable expense to affirm their processes 
and that ameliorative action can be taken if ‘mistakes’ happen along the way.  Of course, 
once the environment has been degraded and the community destroyed, ameliorative 
action is most likely too little, too late but the CSR Manager would have fulfilled their role 
while any resultant social or environmental downsides would be considered ‘collateral 
damage’, a symptom of our necessary endeavour for growth.    
Adam Smith famously wrote: “[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, 
even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise process” [WN I x.c. 27 p145]. Elsewhere Smith 
elaborated on this point by stating that merchants were able to use their proximity to 
power and economic means to make their “sophistry and clamour” [WN IV ii 43 p471, 
quoted in Muller 2003] more effective than their rivals in order to enforce their will.  This is 
not to say that they are “basterds” [Freeman Wicks Pamar, 2011], rather, it is to make the 
                                                             
87 See: Hamilton and Sanders [1999] and Deboub et.al [1995] for more detailed analysis 
88 See above reference to KPMG [FN92] with BAE and refer also to Arthur Anderson and ENRON (see: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2047122.stm for evidence that consultants are likely to be complicit in 
poor corporate behaviours.  Although Andersons is now defunct it seems unpersuasive that these were the 
actions of a few ‘bad eggs’ rather, it is likely to that employees of major corporate auditors, management 
consultants and CSR consultancies (which are generally divisions of the two previous types of business) are 
under the same psychological pressures as the employees within the businesses they serve.  No business pays 
a management consultant large sums of money to tell them not to undertake a project in which they are 
almost certain to make considerable profit; that would be considered bad business advice. 
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point that there is an accepted wisdom within a group which assumes the furtherance of its 
own wellbeing is the right and appropriate action.  Galbraith describes this phenomenon in 
his pamphlet The Economics of Innocent Fraud [2004] where he states “this is not the 
contrivance of any individual or group but represents the natural, even righteous view of 
what serves personal or larger interest” [p4-5] [...] [w]hat prevails in real life is not the reality 
but the current fashion and the pecuniary interest”[p5].  Hence the cognitive dissonance is 
dissolved and corporate employees are able to live comfortably with the contradiction 
between their actions at work and their moral framework. 
In summary, the individuals that enable business to destroy the environment and 
exploit people are average people with the typical range of moral outlooks.  Yet the fact of 
operating within a company or buying a product as a consumer separates individuals from 
reality by associating them with a group the behaviour of which is considered perfectly 
reasonable.  Within this psychological framework it seems highly unlikely that voluntarily 
agreed CSR programmes would ever be able to promote the changes necessary in business 
practice to ensure that business operated with Human Rights oriented behaviours.   
Conclusion 
Business in the globalised world has managed to circumvent the shackles of 
regulation within the developed economies and seek greater profit margins and higher 
share-holder returns by participating in a ‘race to the bottom’ which undermines Human 
Rights protection and provision to varying degrees in all States.  Conversely, business 
investment and activity are central to any State’s ability to meet its Human Rights 
obligations.  Indeed the purpose of the business within the capitalist system is to synthesise 
risk and opportunity for the betterment of society.   
 It is clear that CSR has been identified as the primary method of controlling business 
excess and harnessing the power of business for the well-being of humanity.  Yet it appears 
duplicitous to emphasise CSR whilst maintaining a business’s fiduciary obligations to its 
shareholders.  By maintaining this theoretical position, States and the UN are implicitly 
prioritising economic development over Human Rights.    
CSR professionals and academics have sought to prove this analysis is incorrect.  
Through the application of, amongst other theories, Stakeholder Theory and Universal 
Ownership Theory, CSR professionals and businesses ethicists have asserted that good 
business decisions require Human Rights to be taken into account.  Yet there is considerable 
evidence that the business decisions which create the most value for shareholders 
frequently undermine this assertion.  Customers have not demonstrated a consistent 
willingness to look beyond price when buying goods despite their distaste for business’ 
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Human Rights violations and investors, in general, make business decisions based on their 
own fiduciary duties rather than utilising a moral framework.   
Hence the appearance of CSR has taken precedence over practical implementation.  
It is frequently perceived, therefore, that business employees operate cynically with the 
intention of misleading society to facilitate their exploitation of people and the environment 
for their individual gain.  Understandably, this argument faces tough opposition within the 
businesses community because it implies that corporate employees and decision-makers 
are “basterds” [Freeman Wicks Pamar, 2011] who prioritise profit over people. Indeed we 
can be reasonably certain that most people would not consciously prefer to make decisions 
that negatively impact humans or their environment hence it is probably unhelpful to 
personalise corporate behaviour, rather we should recognise that corporate employees do 
not make business decision under the aegis of their own moral frameworks.   
It is this dichotomy which leads us to the nub of the issue.  Business decision making 
necessitates conscienceless thought processes which are predicated on the utilitarian 
assumption that economic growth will increase living standards for all quicker than any 
other method.  In contrast, Human Rights are designed to protect the individual against 
utilitarian decision making that imposes sacrifice on one for the greater good.  Consequently 
business decisions frequently conflict with Human Rights standards which the majority of 
people would hope are applied to their lives. Thus, the typical corporate employee or 
consumer experiences cognitive dissonance between their personal moral frameworks and 
the Capitalist Realist framework they apply as an employee or consumer.  
Psychological analyses of group behaviours which have enabled the worst examples 
of human behaviour (e.g. the Holocaust) go some way to explaining how corporate 
structures enable this dissonance to persist.  Such analysis also implies that it is unrealistic 
to expect individuals within the group to change the assumptions and behaviours of that 
group.  In short, it is unlikely that a CSR professional or a business decision-maker will put 
voluntary Human Rights oriented obligations above their fiduciary obligations and the 
general well-being of the social group they belong to.  
If the global community of governments is to meet their Human Rights obligations 
and make business operate in a more socially responsible manner, they must recognise the 
reality of business decision-making processes.  With this knowledge in hand, it is then 
possible to recalibrate the economic system to make human rights provision and protection 
a by-product of business activity.  This recalibration will necessarily be affected by 
processes, incentives or regulations that directly and predictably effect business profitability 
and therefore managers’ fiduciary obligations which, ultimately, determine corporate 
behaviour and consequently business activity generally.  In short, policy makers should heed 
Galbraith [1999] and jettison the familiar idea of fostering voluntarily responsible business 
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and solve this conundrum through bold actions which affect real rather than cosmetic 
change.    
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